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Products Liability and the First Amendment: The
Liability of Publishers for Failure to Warn
If a manufacturer sells a hair tonic injurious to humans, an injured con-
sumer has a potential cause of action. If a publisher publishes the formula
for that same hair tonic, an injured reader has no means of legal redress.'
What justifies this apparent anomaly? The notion that ideas hold a "prefer-
red position" in our society is an inevitable response to that question.2 But
that answer only begs the question.3
Putting aside catch phrases which obscure rather than illuminate issues,'
the necessary starting point for any first amendment analysis is a realization
that the first amendment does not categorically bar all liability for speech.
Besides the familiar torts of defamation and invasion of privacy,5 many other
torts, such as false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
fraud, and battery, can all be accomplished by words.6 This Note discusses
whether any conceivable circumstances exist in which a publisher7 owes a duty
of care in the use of printed language to prevent physical harm to readers.
Three recent cases alleging a duty of care in the use of language owed by
the media to the public were based in part upon a theory of products liability.8
The success of a plaintiff in one of these cases makes it reasonable to assume
that unconventional and controversial applications of the products liability
theory will continue. The first section of this Note9 reconciles these cases in
a proposed analytic framework based upon the theory of products liability:
a publisher owes a duty of care when publishing material with the intention
1. MacKown v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co., 289 Ill. App. 59, 6 N.E.2d 526 (1937).
For a discussion of MacKown, see infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
2. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
3. Robert McKay argues that particular quote has been erroneously linked to Justice Stone's
famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and
as a result has been a source of much confusion. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1182, 1184 (1959).-
4. Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 808, 840 (1969)
[hereinafter referred to as The Chilling Effect].
5. Of course, there are some constitutional restrictions on standard of fault to be imposed
in defamation actions. See infra notes 150-76 and accompanying text.
6. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 683 (4th ed. llth printing 1981) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
7. This discussion is explicitly limited to publishers as opposed to broadcasters because the
proposed theory is based upon products liability. Although the underlying principles of the pro-
posed theory could be applied to the broadcast media, it would be stretching the imagination
to find the "seller" and "buyer" required for products liability actions unless something like
"pay TV" is involved.
8. See infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
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that it be relied upon, the subject matter was such that one who acted in
reliance upon it would be harmed physically should the material prove to be
designed defectively,' 0 the defendant did not use reasonable care to determine
if the material was safe for its intended use and did not warn of any dangers
associated with that use, the plaintiff acted in reasonable reliance upon the
published material, and the plaintiff was physically injured as a result of that
reliance. I I
The second section of this Note illustrates that historically courts have been
reluctant to hold the media liable for the content it communicates to the public,
fearing the creation of a new duty resulting in potential unlimited liability
of the media would be entailed.' 2 The second section also demonstrates,
however, that the general rule of compensation for physical harm has always
been followed in other circumstances when the negligent use of language results
in physical injury. Consequently, the basis of the courts' policy concerns is
undermined. '3
Courts have also feared that the imposition of a duty of care upon publishers
in the use of language to prevent physical harm to readers would violate the
first amendment. The third section of this Note examines the proposed theory
in light of present constitutional doctrine and concludes that the proposed
theory passes constitutional scrutiny."
I. RECONCILIATION OF THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES IN THE
PROPOSED ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
Three recent products liability cases brought against the media arose from
contrasting factual contexts.'" In two cases, the complaints were dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In Carter v.
Rand McNally,'6 however, the plaintiff's claims alleging negligent publishing
survived pretrial dismissal. 7 A junior high school textbook was published con-
taining an experiment using methyl alcohol, a highly flammable substance
with combustible fumes, and included no warnings concerning these dangerous
properties. I A student was permanently scarred from an explosion of methyl
10. See infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
11. See infra note 93.
12. See infra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 97-176 and accompanying text.
15. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983); DeFilippo v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982); Carter v. Rand McNally, No. 76-1864-F
(D. Mass. 1980) (unreported case cited in Swartz, You Can't Judge a Book by Its Cover, TRIAL,
Nov. 1981, at 89, 110 [hereinafter referred to as Swartz].
16. No. 76-1864-F (D. Mass. 1980) (unreported case cited in Swartz, supra note 15, at 90).
17. The plaintiff alleged failure to warn, inadequate directions in both the teacher's and the
students' manual, and inadequate design. Swartz, supra note 15, at 90.
18.
Methyl alcohol was introduced in the textbook to these children without safety
instructions and warnings, even though other less dangerous substances such as
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alcohol vapors ignited by a bunsen burner flame.' 9 Although brought to trial
in September 1980, the case was ultimately settled for $1.1 million. 20
The theory of products liability was not so successful in DeFilippo v.
National Broadcasting Co.2 In a 1979 episode of The Tonight Show, Johnny
Carson attempted a stunt with the help of his guest, stuntman Gar Robinson.22
Robinson was shown standing on a gallows with a hood over his head and
a noose around his neck.23 The trapdoor opened, and he fell through
uninjured.' Several hours after the broadcast, Mr. and Mrs. DeFilippo found
their son, Nicky, dead, hanging from a noose in front of the television set.2"
The television set was on and tuned to the local station which had broadcast
The Tonight Show.26 The parents brought a wrongful death action alleging
as one cause of action the theory of products liability.27 The Supreme Court
of Rhode Island did not reach the issue of whether a television broadcast
is a product, but found in any event that the claim was barred by the first
amendment. 2
A case factually similar to DeFilippo, Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,29
reached the same result. On August 6, 1981, a young boy discovered the body
of his fourteen year-old friend hanging by a belt from a closet door.3 At
his dead friend's feet lay a copy of Hustler magazine.3' It was opened to
an article entitled Orgasm of Death, describing the practice of autoerotic
asphyxiation in which males seek to derive heightened sexual pleasure from
masturbation by simultaneously depriving the brain of oxygen.3 2 The dead
glycerine or ethylene glyco would have accomplished the same academic purpose.
... The plaintiff argued that there were no instructions to the students regarding
the wearing of protective clothing such as fire-protective aprons and face shields,
even though when sophisticated adults use methyl alcohol, its utilization involves
adequate warnings, instructions, and a proper container for housing the product.
None of these basic minimal safety procedures and precautions were recommended
in the textbook despite the fact that the book was intended for use by ninth grade
youngsters.
Swartz, supra note 15, at 90 (the author of the article was the plaintiff's attorney).
19. Swartz, supra note 15, at 90.
20. Swartz, supra note 15, at 90.
21. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
22. Id. at 1037-38.




27. The plaintiff's complaint actually alleged four different theories of recovery, negligence,
failure to warn, products liability, and intentional tort-trespass. Id.
28. The trial judge had found that a television broadcast is not a product. Id.
29. 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
30. Plaintiff's Original Complaint at 3, Herceg.
31. Plaintiff's Original Complaint at 3, Herceg.
32.
Typically, the practitioner rigs up a noose-often a rope or a belt-and cuts off
his air supply at the height of sexual excitement. The brain deprived of oxygen,
experiences a "high" accompanied by giddiness, light-headedness and exhilara-
tion. Often the practitioner will pass out for a few minutes, then revive. Sometimes,
19841
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boy's parents brought a wrongful death action against Hustler, and the boy's
friend joined as a co-plaintiff alleging physical and emotional injury." The
primary basis of the complaint was the theory of products liability: the
magazine was defectively designed, the magazine was unreasonably dangerous
for its intended use, and the magazine reached the consumer without substantial
change in its condition.3 4 The complaint was dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.3 5
The proposed theory reconciles the holdings of these cases. The salient fac-
tor in the theory is that the publisher must induce a reader to act:36 the
publisher must intend that the material be relied upon and the reader must
reasonably do so.3 The proposed theory is aimed at restricting speech "trig-
gering action"; 38 the speaker purposefully induces reliance, thereby dissuading
readers from verifying it. Speech in that form, without any warnings, "[is]
no essential part of any exposition of ideas" because its "very utterance [in-
flicts] injury."' The textbook case was the only one of the three products
though, he never comes out of it....
One factor pops up again and again in these cases-the use by men of female
undergarments or intimate apparel. The relationship between transvestite practices-
cross-dressing-and sexual asphyxiation is not clear. Some psychotherapists have
attempted to link erotic hangings to early childhood fascination for ropes and chains,
to binding with women's undergarments, and to the whole spectrum of adult bon-
dage and sadomasochism.
Milner, Orgasm of Death, HUSTLER, Aug. 1981, at 33, 34 [hereinafter referred to as HUSTLER].
The article claims that coroners estimate 1,000 young people, mostly males, die each year from
the practice. HUSTLER, supra, at 33. "Researchers for the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimate
conservatively that 500 to 1,000 such deaths occur each year in this country, but that most are
misdiagnosed as suicide or homicide or covered up by the family because of the social stigma
that surrounds a sexually motivated death." Brody, 'Autoerotic Death' of Youth Causes Widen-
ing Concern, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1984, at 17, col. 4. For a discussion of the autoerotic prac-
tice, see generally R. HAZELWOOD & P. DIETZ, AUTOEROTIC FATALITIES (1983).
33. Plaintiff's Original Complaint at 3, Herceg.
34. The exact theory (or theories) of the complaint is hard to discern. The complaint alleged
negligent publishing, defective product, dangerous instrumentality, and attractive nuisance. Plain-
tiff's Original Complaint at 3, Herceg.
35. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend on the basis of the plaintiffs' failure
to meet the Brandenburg v. Ohio test, see infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text, by omitting
an allegation of "incitement." Herceg, 565 F. Supp. at 805. However, the facts of that case
make it virtually impossible for the plaintiff to meet that test.
36. Compare Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969),
in which the publisher of Good Housekeeping Magazine was held liable for injuries resulting
from a product given the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. The court held,
[s]ince the very purpose of respondent's seal and certification is to induce con-
sumers to purchase products so endorsed, it is foreseeable certain consumers will
do so, relying upon respondent's representations concerning them, in some instances,
even more than upon statements made by the retailer manufacturer or distributor.
276 Cal. App. 2d at 684, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (emphasis added).
37. See supra text accompanying note 10.
38. Professor Tribe argues that speech is valuable only in the context of a dialogue, "[it
is not plausible to uphold the right to use words as projectiles where no exchange of views is
involved." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 605 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as TRIBE].
39. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
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liability cases in which inducement was present4 since the textbook was pub-
lished with explicit instructions to be relied upon, and the student acted
reasonably in following them.
Cardozo v. True4 ' is another case exemplifying the concept of inducement.
In Cardozo, a cookbook was published containing a recipe using natural in-
gredients. While following one of the book's recipes, the plaintiff tasted one
of the ingredients called for in that recipe and became ill.4 ' The proposed
theory would recognize a cause of action in such a case because a cookbook
is paradigmatic of material published with the intention that readers rely upon
it.
At the other end of the spectrum are the DeFilippo43 and Herceg"4 cases.
In DeFilippo, no evidence was presented that Johnny Carson or anyone else
intended that the stunt be imitated. Nor is it reasonable to imitate a stunt
performed by professionals aided by specially designed props when viewers
are warned against it. 4 Likewise, the Hustler article was not written in the
form of a "how-to" manual. To the contrary, explicit warnings against prac-
ticing autoerotic asphyxiation were given at the beginning and end of the
article. 4" It can hardly be considered reasonable to imitate an act described
when the article specifically states that 1,000 people die from doing so every
year.47
Even though the proposed theory would recognize a cause of action in the
textbook case, the plaintiff would still have the burden of proving the material
was "defectively designed." 4 1 Although the products liability cases brought
to date involving speech have been based in part upon several different
theories," this Note argues that defective design and its subcategory failure
to warn are more appropriate. In a strict liability case, an unflawed product
40. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
41. 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (court dismissing breach of warranty claim
against bookseller based on U.C.C.).
42. Id. at 1054.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
44. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
45. Stuntman Gar Robinson told Johnny Carson before he tried the stunt, "I've seen people
try things like this.... I happen to know somebody who did something similar to it, just fooling
around and almost broke his neck." DeFilippo, 446 A.2d at 1038.
46. The article was prefaced: "Note: Hustler realizes the often-fatal results of the practice
of 'auto-asphyxia' and recommends that readers seeking unique forms of sexual release DO NOT
AT1EMPT this method. The facts are presented here solely for an educational purpose." HusTLn,
supra note 32, at 33. The article concluded,
[r]ecognizing the syndrome early is one way to stop a friend or relative before he
or she takes the ultimate one-way trip. But it is also important to know-beyond
a doubt-that auto-asphyxiation is one form of sex play you try only if you're
anxious to wind up in cold storage, with a coroner's tag on your big toe.
HusTLER, supra note 32, at 34.
47. See supra note 32.
48. See supra text accompanying note 10.
49. See supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
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is the standard by which a flawed product is judged." The proposed theory
is aimed at flaws resulting from the designer's faulty judgment, not at defects
resulting from one copy of published material differing from another.
Therefore, the precise theory of products liability used in this Note's analysis
is defective design. For purposes of this Note, the term products liability is
synonymous with section 402A of the Restatement of Torts" and the stan-
dard of fault imposed in defective design cases is negligence."
An important feature of the proposed theory is that a publisher can com-
pletely avoid all liability by exercising reasonable care to warn of any dangers
associated with reliance on the published material." This concept is analogous
to the "unavoidably unsafe products" doctrine in traditional products liability
analysis. 4 Some products, for instance vaccines, cannot be made completely
safe for their intended use, but they are not defective or unreasonably
dangerous because of their value to society." Similarly, a publisher is not
under a duty to redesign material to make it safe, only the addition of a
warning is required. Therefore, the proposed theory does not act as an ab-
solute bar to the publishing of any material potentially beneficial to society.
50. Note, Seller's Liability For Defective Design-The Measure Of Responsibility, 37 WASH.
LEE L. REv. 237, 238 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Seller's Liability for Defective Design].
51. Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
52. There is by no means a consensus concerning the standard of fault in defective design
cases but something stricter than negligence is generally applied. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 886-87 (Alaska 1979) (shifting the burden of proof-to the defendant);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979) (proof that pro-
duct did not meet consumer expectation test, then defectiveness of product is established without
proof of negligence); Morningstar v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682 (W. Va.
1979) (imputing knowledge of defect to defendant). See generally Seller's Liability for Defective
Design, supra note 50.
53. See infra note 118.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment 2 (1965).
55.
The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for
it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment 2 (1965).
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, courts have refused to recognize a cause of action based on
physical injuries resulting from published or broadcast material. The underlying
premise of the courts' analyses is that a recognition of the plaintiffs' claims
requires the creation of a new duty. This Note demonstrates, however, that
the general rule of awarding compensation for physical harm has always been
followed in other instances of negligent use of language. In other words, the
proposed theory does not require the creation of a new duty. Since no policy
reasons justify departure from the general rule, this Note argues that a duty
of care in the use of language to prevent physical harm should be imposed
upon the media.
A. The Reluctance to Impose Liability Upon the Media
In MacKown v. Illinois Publishing and Printing Co.,6 a reader brought
suit against a newspaper for injuries received after using a dandruff formula
recommended in the paper. The Illinois Court of Appeals dismissed the claim,
finding that the newspaper owed no duty to the plaintiff." The state appellate
court specifically based its decision on the doctrine announced by Judge Car-
dozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.58
[N]egligent words are not actionable unless they are uttered directly, with
knowledge or notice that they will be acted on, to one to whom the speaker
is bound by some relation of duty, arising out of public calling, contract
or otherwise, to act with care if he acts at all.5 9
Since MacKown, courts have refused on the basis of Ultramares to recognize
an action against the media involving physical injuries received by the public.
For example, publishers are under no duty to investigate products advertised
on their pages," or to verify the accuracy of maps and treaties. 6' Courts deny
liability in these cases because of the fear that the exposure of the media " 'to
liability to an indeterminate amount to an indeterminate class' "61 could have
56. 289 I11. App. 59, 6 N.E.2d 526 (1937).
57. Id. at 68, 6 N.E.2d at 530.
58. The court held that "[u]nder the doctrine announced by Chief Judge Cardozo, we think
that the defendant newspaper in the instant case is not liable." Id. (citing Ultramares v. Touche,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931)).
59. 289 I11. App. at 67, 6 N.E.2d at 530 (quoting Judge Cardozo).
60. E.g., Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 322 A.2d 824 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
See also S. METCALF, RioHTs ArD LABmrruis OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND REPORTERS
§ 7.05, at 7-16 (1982). But cf. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr.
519 (1969) (holding a publisher liable for injuries resulting from a product given its Good
Housekeeping Seal).
61. See, e.g., De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 148 (5th Cir.
1971) (although holding the United States liable under a statutorily created duty).
62. Yuhas, 129 N.J. Super. at 209-10, 322 A.2d at 825 (quoting Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at
180, 174 N.E. at 444).
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potential disastrous economic effects on the media.63 The significance of the
courts' reliance on Ultramares in these media cases derives from the fact that
the plaintiffs' complaints are viewed as advocating the creation of a new duty
of care as opposed to the extension of one that presently exists."' The crea-
tion of a new duty is essentially a question of social policy. 5 The plaintiff
has the burden of proving that policy considerations weigh in his or her favor, 66
presumably something not required when a duty already exists. For example,
in Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 67 the federal district court
viewed the plaintiff's complaint as advocating the creation of a new duty68
and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on that basis. In Zamora, parents brought
an action against the three major networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS in behalf
of their minor son, Ronny, alleging that Ronny had become "involuntarily
addicted to television and 'completely subliminally intoxicated' " by the violent
programming offered by the networks. 69 They further alleged that the net-
works had breached their duty to prevent Ronny from imitating what he
viewed, resulting in his murdering his eighty-three year old neighbor."0
The court characterized the issue as whether a new duty of care owed by
the media should be created: "How and why should the Court create such
a wide expansion in the law of torts in Florida?""' The plaintiffs did not
demonstrate that policy considerations weighed in favor of the imposition of
this duty. In fact, the plaintiffs advanced no policy reasons whatsoever in
favor of their "novel" theory. No argument was made and no evidence was
presented that the networks could predict and therefore prevent this type of
reaction to broadcast material, something apparently his own parents could
not do. On the other hand, the court found public policy reasons weighing
against the plaintiffs' theory." The court pointed out that their theory gave
63. "[T]he usual publishers of newspapers, treatises, and maps lack the financial resources
to compensate an indeterminate class who might read their work. Potential liability would have
a staggering deterrent effect on potential purveyors of printed material." De Bardeleben Marine,
451 F.2d at 148.
De Bardeleben Marine, 451 F.2d at 148.
64. For example in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983),
the court held that "In]either does the case law support plaintiffs' cause of action for negligent
publication of an article they allege harmed a reader. 'Negligent' publication is a cause of action
that arose in defamation cases."
65. See PROSSER, supra note 6, § 42, at 244.
66. See PROSSER, supra note 6, § 53, at 325-26 ("But it should be recognized that 'duty'
is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of
policy which say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.").
67. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
68. "[T]here is no obligation (as demanded by plaintiffs) presently articulated in the law
.Id. at 201.
69. Id. at 200.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 203.
72. The court also noted that the complaint was frought with difficulties. First, Florida does
not recognize the negligent infliction of emotional injuries unaccompanied by physical injury.
Id. at 202. Furthermore, the alleged tortfeasors were joint only in the sense that the plaintiff
had joined them together, the acts were separate and disconnected. Id. at 202 n.4. Finally, the
complaint was overbroad. Id. at 202 n.2.
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the networks no guidelines to follow in avoiding future liability and made
competent administration by the courts of these types of cases impossible.
73
In short, the court viewed the plaintiffs' theory as "against public policy."
74
B. The Historical Fallacy
The previous discussion shows that courts customarily view negligence ac-
tions against the media as involving the creation of a new duty on the basis
of Ultramares. However, Ultramares does not support this conclusion. In
Ultramares,75 an accounting company prepared a balance sheet for one of
its customers, and a third party relying upon that balance sheet loaned the
customer a considerable amount of money. The customer defaulted, and the
lender brought an action against the accountants, alleging fraud and negligent
misrepresentation. 76 Judge Cardozo denied liability, stating:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries may
expose accountants to liability to an indeterminate amount for an indeter-
minate time to an indeterminate class. 77
Therefore, the accountants could not be held liable to third parties absent
privity between them.
The courts' reliance on Ultramares in the media cases is misplaced for several
reasons. First, the Ultramares rule is not an absolute bar to liability when
privity is lacking between the plaintiff and defendant. When a defendant in-
tends that his representations be relied upon, courts are not reluctant to im-
pose liability merely because the plaintiff is an unidentified member of an
73. Id. at 202 (citing De Bardeleben Marine, 451 F.2d at 148; Yuhas, 129 N.J. Super. at
209-10, 322 A.2d at 825; Ultramares, 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441).
74. The Zamora court left open the possibility that a more justifiable theory might be accepted.
"Airway dissemination is and to some extent, should be regulated, but not on the basis or by
the procedure suggested by the plaintiffs." Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 203 (citations omitted).
75. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441.
76. American misrepresentation law owes its origins to English case Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C.
337 (1889). In that case a buyer of stock was induced to buy stock in a tramway company by
a prospectus incorrectly stating that the company had the right to use steam power instead of
horses. Id. Since the company did not have consent to use that power, the stock was worthless
and the buyer sued in an action for deceit. Id. The plaintiff could not prove that the defendants
consciously falsified information, an element of the action of deceit, so the defendant was found
not liable. Id. In dictum, the court held that "[a]n action of deceit based on fraud cannot be
supported by proof of negligent misrepresentation." Smith, Liability for Negligent Language,
14 HAgv. L. Rav. 184, 185 (1909) [hereinafter cited as Smith]. Although negligence was not
plead in that action so relief could not be granted on that basis, that case has been interpreted
to mean "not only that negligence is not the same as fraud, but also that no action whatever
will lie for negligent misrepresentation." Note, VII L.Q. REv., 295, 310 (1891). Although the
tort of misrepresentation is not as narrow as the action in deceit, courts have limited its applica-
tion to those cases in which there is an intent to deceive and have decided actions based on
strict liability and negligence in other tort actions. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 105, at 684. However,
this basic underlying misconception has caused much confusion in misrepresentation cases. See
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 105, at 684-85.
77. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 444.
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indeterminate class.7" In Ultramares, Cardozo distinguished Glanzer v.
Shepherd"9 in which he had found a public weigher of beans liable for
negligence to third parties, pointing out that in Glanzer the information was
"primarily" for the benefit of the third party and only "incidentally" for
the benefit of its clients."0 The facts of the media cases are more analogous
to Glanzer than to Ultramares because the material is published for the primary
benefit of readers. Secondly, modern courts err in relying on Ultramares
because the rule has been overruled in a majority of jurisdictions. 8'
Most importantly, courts have failed to make the crucial distinction be-
tween economic and physical harm. Courts have always been more willing
to impose liability when physical harm is involved.8 2 The Ultramares rule has
78. See PROSSER, supra note 6, § 107, at 707.
It would seem from the face of the opinion that Ultramares stands, not for the
proposition that there can be no third-party negligent liability of accountants, but
for the proposition that such liability does not exist where the certification is not
for the primary benefit of the third party.
Shaw, Liability of Public Accountant to Third Parties, 46 A.L.R.3d 979, 986 (1972).
79. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
80. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 185, 174 N.E. at 446.
81. See PROSSER, supra note 6, § 107, at 705. Likewise, the English rule has been at least
partially overruled in cases of economic harm. See Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners,
1964 A.C. 465. Compare section 552 of the Restatement of Torts:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information ex-
tends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty
is created, in any of-the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965).
82. "Throughout the law of torts, the courts have been a great deal more reluctant to com-
pensate the plaintiff for a loss of purely economic character, and this is particularly true where
the defendant's conduct has been no more than negligent." Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third
Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231, 232 (1966). See also Note, Torts-Action for Negligent
Misrepresentation Which Causes Financial Loss in Business Dealings May be Maintained by One
of Class Whose Reliance upon Such Misrepresentation Can be Reasonably Foreseen, 48 VA.
L. Rav. 1476, 1479 (1962) (citing Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928) (negligent
assurance by doctor that there was no danger from smallpox); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn.
323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) (negligent assurance by doctor that it was safe to visit child with
contagious disease); Valz v. Goodykoontz, 112 Va. 853, 72 S.E. 730 (1911) (negligent assurance
that there was no danger from blasting operations)). The English version of the Ultramares rule,
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never been followed in these cases. At first blush the idea of liability based
on negligence in the use of language might seem incredible, but misrepresen-
tation forms the basis of many torts, both intentional83 and negligent.
A great many of the common and familiar forms of negligent conduct,
resulting in invasions of tangible interests of person or property, are in
their essence nothing more than misrepresentation from a misleading signal
by a driver of an automobile about to make a turn, or an assurance that
a danger does not exist ... or non-disclosure of a latent defect by one
who is under a duty to give a warning."
Historical reasons along with matters of convenience lead to the assimilation
of these torts in the negligence action. 85
Somewhat of a gap in the law of torts, therefore, exists with respect to
published material because at the time this merging occurred, there was no
theory, such as products liability, to support a tort cause of action. Since
a general duty of care in the use of language exists, the question is not, as
the Zamora court asked, whether policy reasons justify imposing this duty
on the media,86 but whether policy reasons justify departing from the general
rule.17 Obviously, the historical basis of this discrepancy does not justify main-
taining the anamoly when the physical safety of individuals is involved.
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Ultramares, it is arguable that the
courts' policy concerns in the media cases are nonetheless valid: the imposi-
tion of a duty of care in the use of language upon the media could have
financially ruinous effects upon the industry. However, the basic premise of
tort law is the protection of the physical safety of individuals.8 8 Strict liability
is imposed upon countless industries with the same potential for unlimited
see supra note 76, was never followed for physical harm either. Prosser, Misrepresentation and
Third Persons, supra, at 235. Although for some time support for this position was found only
in dicta of English cases not directly on point, Liability in Negligence for False Statements, 67
L.Q. REv. 213, 217 (1951); see, e.g., The Spollo, 1891 A.C. 499; Watson v. Buckley, 1 All
E.R. (1940); Sharp v. Avery, 4 All E.R. 85 (1938), a recent case has resolved all ambiguity.
Clayton v. Woodman & Son Ltd., 2 Q.B. 533, 543 (1962) (applying the doctrine of Donoghue
v. Stevenson, 1932 A.C. 562, establishing the liability of manufacturers to consumers not in
privity for physical harm).
83. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
84. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 105, at 683. For example, see Washington & Berkeley Bridge
Co. v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 226 F. 169 (4th Cir. 1915) (contractor's assurances to foreman
that bridge was safe); Miller v. Watkins, 355 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1962) (waving truck driver to pass
on); Sweet v. Ringwelski, 362 Mich. 138, 106 N.W.2d 742 (1961) (motioning child to cross street);
Robb v. Gylock Corp., 384 Pa. 209, 120 A.2d 174 (1956) (assurances that acid carboys empty).
85. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 105, at 683.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
87. Compare WVeirum v. RKO Gen., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975),
in which the court imposed liability upon a radio station for negligently conducting a contest.
See infra text accompanying notes 109-13. In that case, the court started with the premise "that
all persons are to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as a result of their
conduct." RKO, 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
88. Cf. Seavey, Cardler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., Negligent Misrepresentation by Accoun-
tants, 67 L.Q. REv. 466, 472 ("Anglo-American courts have not given the same protection to
purely economic interests as has been afforded to the interest in the physical security of the
person or things, of reputation or of family relations.").
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liability. The law has in effect imposed a fiduciary duty upon the manufac-
turer by virtue of his knowingly introducing products into the stream of com-
merce destined for personal use.89 No policy considerations exempt a publisher
from this general duty of care in the use of language." As the textbook case
illustrates, "[it is important that we are willing to pioneer new areas of pro-
ducts liability because, short of prevention, this kind of prosecution is the
only alternative left to encourage adequate preventive safety programs." 9 '
When the public seeks information to protect itself, public policy considera-
tions weigh in favor of encouraging disclosure.2
The proposed analytic framework fills in the historical gap. Although it
borrows language from the tort of misrepresentation," it is explicitly based
upon a products liability analysis. The body of case law surrounding the tort
of misrepresentation principally deals with harm to economic interests.94 As
a matter of practicality, it seems better to advance a theory couched in terms
and concepts already familiar to judges and lawyers in dealing with invasions
of physical interests.9 5
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. Prior Media Cases
Although public policy concerns do not bar the proposed theory, courts
have also been reluctant to impose liability on the media because of constitu-
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965) ("On whatever theory, thejustification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product
for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member
of the consuming public who may be injured by it ....").
90. For a discussion of the constitutional considerations see infra notes 96-176 and accom-
panying text.
91. Swartz, supra note 15, at 90.
92. Cf. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT.
REv. 173, 176 ("Where, however, the information is sought not by members of the public, acting
as it were in self protection, but by the government, the claim of privacy is stronger.") [hereinafter
referred to as Posner].
93. The proposed theory is patterned after a theory designed to deal with negligent misrepresen-
tation in economic transactions found in Smith, supra note 76, at 195-96.
94. See PROSSER, supra note 6, § 105, at 684.
95. The law of misrepresentation has to some extent adapted to invasions of physical in-
terests but this has not led to the development of a body of case law dealing with the duty
to warn. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 310, 311 (1965) (section 310 dealing
with fraudulent misrepresentation involving an unreasonable risk of harm to another and section
311 dealing with false information negligently given to another). Section 557A of the Restate-
ment of Torts does include the duty to warn: "One who by a fraudulent misrepresentation or
non-disclosure of a fact that it is his duty to disclose causes physical harm to the person or
chattel of another who justifiably relies upon the misrepresentation, is subject to liability to the
other." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 557A (1965). The problem with those sections is
that they do not carry with them extensive doctrines that the body of case law surrounding the
doctrine of products liability has developed to deal with physical harm. For example, products
liability has developed doctrines concerning allergies and products which are only unsafe when
consumed in excess. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
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tional concerns. Implicit in the Herceg," DeFilippo,91 and Zamora" courts'
constitutional analyses is the premise that the fear of damage awards is as
inhibiting to the exercise of first amendment rights as criminal sanctions;
therefore, the plaintiffs can succeed only by showing that the speech in ques-
tion falls into a category unprotected by the first amendment."9
The Brandenburg v. Ohio' 0 standard, which directs that a state may not
"forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to produce such lawless action,"'"' is identified as the
only conceivable category in which the plaintiffs could succeed. Since the plain-
tiffs are unable to prove "incitement" in these cases, the courts find their
claims barred by the first amendment.'0 2
96. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
97. See DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1040 (R.I. 1982).
98. See Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
99. "Those classes of speech which states may proscribe within First Amendment guidelines
are obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 . . . (1973) . . .Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 ... (1957); fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 ... (1942);
defamatory invasions of privacy, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 ... (1952); and words
likely to produce imminent lawless action (incitement), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444.
(1969) (per curiam)." DeFilippo, 446 A.2d at 1039.
100. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
101. Id. at 447 (involving a conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism statute).
102. DeFilippo, 446 A.2d at 1041; see also Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 206; accord Herceg,
565 F. Supp. at 805 (granting plaintiff's leave to amend complaint by adding allegation of incite-
ment). Not only are the courts' analyses in Herceg and DeFilippo a gross oversimplification
of first amendment law, but they are patently wrong. The Brandenburg test denies protection
only to speech that advocates or is directed to advocating lawless action. Brandenburg, 444 U.S.
at 447. The incitement test is one of several tests developed to deal with specific categories of
speech, "none of which have been given across-the-board application. Each has been primarily
utilized to sustain governmental regulation in particular contexts." Justice William Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 H~Av. L. Rv.
1, 11 (1965). The Brandenburg test is not even implicated in Herceg or DeFilippo, unless one
is prepared to argue that performing a dangerous stunt is illegal or that the broadcast is an
"incitement to suicide," assuming that attempting suicide is a crime.
An interesting point concerning the Herceg and DeFilippo cases is that assuming the requirements
for incitement have been met, the question remains as to whether the advocated action is "suicide."
Suprisingly enough, this question has sparked a considerable amount of legal debate in the con-
text of insurance policy coverage of death due to autoerotic asphyxiation. The leading case, Runge
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 1157, 1159 (4th Cir. 1976), held that the insurance policy's
double indemnity clause for injuries sustained "solely through external and accidental means,"
did not apply because the decedent had "voluntarily placed himself in a situation where he knew
or should have known that death or serious bodily injury should be the probable consequence
of his acts." Accord, Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Iowa 1981)
(both defendants conceding that the autoerotic practice is not suicide). But see International
Underwriters, Inc. v. The Home Ins. Co., 500 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Va. 1980) (finding that death
by autoerotic practice is "injury" covered by policy, but no double indemnity clause at issue).
The Hustler article indicated that psychologists view the deaths as accidental:
[Tihe critical error is to believe that, as long as you don't actually choke yourself
(compress the windpipe), you can always regain consciousness. In fact, a little too
much pressure on the neck, and you get the baroceptor reflex (which refers to little
valves in an artery that halt the flow of blood when pressure is applied to the vessel).
This reflex-in the case of the main artery supplying blood to the head, the
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In Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co.,I 3 the court's dismissal of the
complaint was based on this rationale. The plaintiff in that case, a nine year
old female, alleged that she was artificially raped with a bottle on a San Fran-
cisco beach." ° She claimed that her minor assailants were imitating a televi-
sion movie, Born Innocent, broadcast four days earlier by NBC.'°5 The movie
contains a scene in which a group of teenage girls in a shower artificially
raped a young girl with a toilet plunger.1 6 During the trial,' 7 the plaintiff
admitted that she could not prove "incitement" under the Brandenburg
standard,' and the case was dismissed on that basis. 0 9 On appeal, the trial
court's decision was upheld." 0
The Olivia N. court distinguished Weirum v. RKO General' as precedent
carotid-leads to rapid unconsciousness, and the victim may then fall on his noose
or belt in such a way as to produce hanging and asphyxia, resulting in death.
HUSaLER, supra note 32, at 33.
103. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981).
104. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
105. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
106.
The subject matter of the television film was the harmful effect of a state-run home
upon an adolescent girl who had become a ward of the state. In one scene of the
film, the young girl enters the community bathroom of the facility to take a shower.
She is then shown taking off her clothes and stepping into the shower, where she
bathes for a few moments. Suddenly, the water stops and a look of fear comes
across her face. Four adolescent girls are standing across from her in the shower.
One of the girls is carrying a "plumber's helper," waving it suggestively by her
side. The four girls violently attack the younger girl wrestling her to the floor.
The young girl is shown naked from the waist up, struggling as the older girls
force her legs apart. Then, the television film shows the girl with the plumber's
helper making intensive thrusting motions with the handle of the plunger until one
of the four says, "That's enough." The young girl is left sobbing and naked on
the floor.
126 Cal. App. 3d at 491-92, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
107. That was actually the second time the case had been scheduled for trial. In an earlier
proceeding, in Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr.
511 (1977), stay denied, 434 U.S. 1354 (1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978), the California
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of the case before trial on the ground that
there was no "incitement." Id. The court relying in part upon RKO ordered the trial court to
impanel a jury and proceed to trial to determine if the broadcast had "resulted in actionable
injuries." 74 Cal. App. 3d at 390, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 514. The California Supreme Court refused
to hear the broadcaster's appeal and Justice Rehnquist, acting as circuit justice, refused to stay
commencement of the trial, finding that "applicants' claims of irreparable injury resulting from
the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case are not sufficient to warrant . . . granting
their application . . . ." 434 U.S. at 1357 (1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
109. Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d. at 496, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893. On remand the plaintiff's
counsel's in his opening statement to the jury stated that
[tihe plaintiffs in this case at no time in this trial are going to prove what is known
as "incitement." At no time in this trial are we going to prove that either through
negligence or recklessness there was incitement, which incitement is telling someone
to go out encouraging them, directing them, advising them; that there will be no
evidence that NBC ever told anybody or incited anyone to go out and rape a girl
with an artificial instrument or in any other way.
126 Cal. App. 3d at 490-91 n.f, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890 n.l.
110. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 495, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
111. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
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for the plaintiff's claim by implying that case satisfied the incitement test.,1 2
In RKO, a radio station conducted a contest rewarding the first person locating
a mobile disc jockey. A minor in pursuit of the disc jockey's automobile forced
a car off the highway resulting in the death of the driver of the car. The
widow of the deceased driver brought a wrongful death action against the
owner of the radio station, Weirum General, Inc., alleging negligence. The
California Supreme Court viewed the controlling issue in RKO as whether
the defendant radio station owed a duty of care to the decedent " 3 and con-
cluded that the evidence amply supported the jury's finding of a foreseeable
risk to the decedent."" In upholding the liability of the radio station on
negligence grounds, the court readily dismissed the defendant's first amend-
ment arguments:
Defendant's contention that the giveaway contest must be afforded the
deference due society's interest in the First Amendment is clearly without
merit. The issue here is civil accountability for the foreseeable results of
a broadcast which created an undue risk of harm to decedent. The First
Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely
because achieved by word, rather than act.'"
Although cited in numerous cases, the broad language in RKO has never been
the basis for any other decision imposing liability.
The Olivia N.,"1 Zamora,"" and DeFilippo18 courts also expressed fears
112. "Liability was imposed on the broadcaster for urging listeners to act in an inherently
dangerous manner." Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
113. RKO, 15 Cal. 3d at 45-46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
114. 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
115. 15 Cal. 3d at 48, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
116. The plaintiff in Olivia N. argued that NBC "had knowledge of studies on child violence
and should have known that susceptible persons might imitate the crime enacted in the film."
Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891. The Olivia N. court rejected that
argument, fearing that it could "reduce the U.S. adult population to viewing only what is fit
for children." 126 Cal. App. at 494-95, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893. In a recent case, Bill v. The
Superior Court of San Francisco, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1982), the court
relying heavily on Olivia N., rejected that same theory. In Bill, the defendants were granted
an extraordinary writ to compel the trial court to reverse its order denying summary judgment
to the defendants. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1004, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 626. At the trial level, the plain-
tiffs, a mother and daughter, alleged that the defendants, the producers and director of the
movie Boulevard Night, knew that the movie would attract members of the general public "prone"
to violence, that they inadequately warned patrons and did not take steps to protect the patrons,
and that as a result the daughter was shot by a member of the general public attracted to that
movie. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1005, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 626. The court held that an imposition
of the proposed duty and its attendant costs would have a "chilling effect" on speech. 137 Cal.
App. 3d at 1014, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 634. The court made an insightful observation also relevant
to the Zamora and Olivia N. cases,
it is an unfortunate fact that in our society there are people who will react violently
to movies, or other forms of expression, which offend them, whether the subject
matter be gangs, race relations, or the Vietnam war. It may, in fact, be difficult
to predict what particular expression will cause such a reaction, and under what
circumstances. To impose upon the producers of a motion picture the sort of liability
for which plaintiffs contend in this case would, to a significant degree, permit such
persons to dictate, in effect, what is shown in the theaters of our land.
137 Cal. App. 3d at 1008-09, 178 Cal. Rptr at 629.
117. See infra text accompanying note 119.
118. DeFilippo, 446 A.2d at 1042.
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that the plaintiffs' claims would lead to self-censorship on the part of the
media. The media would alter program content in an attempt to escape liability,
thereby reducing the flow of ideas to the public. The Zamora court warned:
[T]he liability sought for by the plaintiffs would place broadcasters in
jeopardy for televising Hamlet, Julius Caesar, Grimm's Fairy Tales; more
contemporary offerings such as All Quiet on the Western Front, and even
The Holocaust, and indeed would render John Wayne a risk not accept-
able to any but the boldest broadcasters." 9
The theory proposed by this Note is free of the constitutional problems
associated with the simple negligence theory, because it does not impose liability
on the basis of the content of the published material. Liability is based on
the material omitted, that is, the warning. Thus, a publisher would not be
deterred from publishing anything because liability could be completely avoided
by a full disclosure of risks.2 0
Since the proposed theory does not directly prohibit speech, the constitu-
tionality of requiring a warning must be examined. The issue is whether the
requirement of additional speech has the indirect effect of abridging publishers'
freedom of speech. Since the esoteric concept of freedom of speech has never
been precisely defined by the Supreme Court and no general theory of the
first amendment has been formulated, 2 ' analysis of the proposed theory in
regard to its "general" effect on freedom of speech would be futile. Instead,
this Note examines specific instances in which the Supreme Court has examined
the constitutionality of compelled speech requirements' 2 and the constitu-
119. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 206.
120. This Note does not reach the issue of whether material expressly intended only for the
use of children might fall under a different standard, i.e., that a publisher might not be able
to discharge his duty by simply adding a warning. For a discussion of the problem of material
intended for children, see Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580
(1981) (action brought under "pied-piper" theory for injuries sustained when a child attempted
to reproduce a television program sound effect).
121. "The law has settled upon no tenable, internally consistent theory of the scope of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971).
122. Several instances in which compelled disclosure requirements have been found to im-
plicate constitutional rights do not warrant detailed analysis in regard to the proposed theory.
First, the right to privacy as found in the fourth amendment only restricts actions constituting
a "search or seizure," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968), and is applied in "cases [involving]
affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy during the course
of criminal investigations." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1976). This, of course,
is not involved in the proposed theory. Secondly, the right to privacy found in the eminations
of the "penumbras" of the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965), or the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty, see
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), has only been applied to matters relating to marriage,
procreation, child rearing, and education. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85
(1977).
In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1976), however, the Court for the first time recognized two
distinct privacy interests: "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,
and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."
Id. at 599-600. Assuming the Court's receptivity to this type of claim (it has never invalidated
a statute on this basis), the Court's language was very fact specific, perhaps recognizing the
public's fear about the collection of massive amounts of information by the government facilitated
[Vol. 59:503
PUBLISHER WARNINGS
tionality of imposing civil liability upon the media and concludes that the
first amendment is not violated by the proposed theory.
B. The Right to Silence
Publishers might argue that the compelled speech requirement violates their
right to silence. First amendment protection extends not only to the right to
speak, but also to the right to refrain from speaking at all.123 For conve-
nience sake, these have been termed, respectively, positive and negative first
amendment rights.'" Of course, this right does not have across the board
application. "Otherwise, the government could hardly force anyone to fill
out a form, answer a census questionnaire, or testify in a civil proceeding."' 5
This section analyzes the specific instances in which the right to silence has
been found applicable and finds them not relevant to the proposed theory.
The right to silence owes its origins to West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette.'6 In Barnette, a requirement of the West Virginia State Board
of Education that students and teachers salute the flag was found to violate
the first amendment.' 7 In announcing the opinion of the Court, Justice
by the use of computers. Id. at 605. See generally A. MInLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971);
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1968); Bayer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right
to Privacy: The Emerging Federal Response, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 37 (1975); Miller, Computers
Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 COLUM. Civ. RTs. L. REV. 1 (1972).
The proposed theory does not implicate this right because subject matter voluntarily published
is necessarily not private. Also, the claim of the right to privacy is not very strong when the
public seeks information to protect itself. See Posner, supra note 92, at 176. The constitutional
right to privacy must be distinguished from the tort right to privacy. In the seminal article by
Warren and Brandeis published in 1890, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, the right
to privacy in the context of libel actions was defined as the "right to be let alone." Warren
& Brandeis, supra, at 193. That definition has never been adopted as a constitutional standard;
"[b]ut the protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of
the individual States." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
The other context in which compelled speech has been found to implicate constitutional rights
is in freedom of association. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
the Court reversed a contempt citation issued against the NAACP for refusal to turn over a
list of its members to the state of Alabama. That decision has never, however, been interpreted
as creating any new fundamental rights. It is only interpreted as protecting the "right to join
with others to pursue goals independently protected by the first amendment." TRIBE, supra note
38, § 12-23, at 702. Since this section of the Note shows that no independently protected con-
stitutional rights are infringed, the right to association is not implicated.
123. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). See also Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943).
124. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Compelled Expression and Association,
23 B.C.L. REV. 995, 995-96 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Gaebler].
125. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372, 394
(1979).
126. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
127. Although the Court held that the first amendment was violated, this decision could be
explained on two different grounds: the fact that the plaintiffs, Jehovah's Witnesses, had ob-
jected on religious grounds, or the fact that refusal to salute the flag constituted symbolic speech.
Lower court decisions after Barnette displayed both of these rationales. See Gaebler, supra note
124, at 995-96.
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Jackson stated, "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein."' 28 The majority's opinion was
based upon the idea that the law protects "the inner life of man" and pro-
hibits government intrusions into "the sphere of intellect and reason." 2 9 The
human conscience is injured at the moment of compromise; more speech in
the form of a disavowal is not a remedy. 31
This interpretation of the right to silence is confirmed in another case to
reach the Court on that same issue. In Wooley v. Maynard,'3 ' the Court held
a New Hampshire law requiring motor vehicles to carry a license plate with
the motto "live free or die" violative of the first amendment.'3 2 The Court
found that although the intrusion on individual liberty was not as great as
in Barnette, the same issue, "individual freedom of the mind," was at stake.,33
As in Barnette, the state regulation "force[d] an individual, as part of his
daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable." 34 The infringement results
not merely from compelled speech, but from the individual being associated
at least in his own mind with a view he finds unacceptable.' 31 After finding
the infringement, the Court concluded that the state had not demonstrated
that the regulation was a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling
state interest. 36
The proposed theory does not implicate the compelling interest test because
there is no infringement of the right to silence. As these cases demonstrate,
the right to silence has only been recognized in regards to individual ideological,
philosophical, and political matters. Although many publications have a con-
science in the sense that they are political, religious, or ideological in their
outlook, presumably their "conscience" is not violated by the involuntary
recitation of factual matters cautioning the public. For instance, in the text-
book case, the warning required by the proposed theory would have con-
cerned the dangerous properties of methyl alcohol. It seems unlikely that a
publisher would argue that warning the public is "morally, ethically, religiously,
and politically abhorrent."'' 3 A publisher's objection most likely would not
128. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
129. Id. at 642.
130. Gaebler, supra note 124, at 1007.
131. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
132. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
133. Id. at 714. The Court expressly declined to examine the symbolic speech issue, pointing
out that if that was at issue, the Maynards would not be asking for "expurgated" plates. Id.
at 713 n.10.
134. Id. at 715.
135. See Gaebler, supra note 124, at 105.
136. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716.
137. Id. at 714 (quoting Mr. Maynard's affidavit: "I refuse to be coerced by the State into
advertising a slogan which I find morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent.").
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be based on the content of the warning, but based on the interference in the
publishing process itself.
C. Press Autonomy
The right of the press to be free from government interference was raised
in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.'38 In Tornillo, the Court in-
validated a criminal statute making it a misdemeanor to refuse a political can-
didate equal space to reply to criticism voiced in the newspaper. 139 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger held that "a responsible press is un-
doubtedly a desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the
Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated."'4 0 At first
glance, the majority opinion's broad language seems quite troublesome from
the standpoint of the proposed theory, but Tornillo does not bar the theory
for two reasons: later cases have narrowly interpreted Tornillo, and the Court's
decision may be explained by traditional first amendment chilling effect
analysis.
In Tornillo, Chief Justice Burger announced that "any such compulsion
to publish that which 'reason tells them should not be published' is
unconstitutional."'' After Pittsburgh Press v. Commission on Human
Relations,' 2 it seems unlikely that a majority of the Court would agree with
Chief Justice Burger's position taken to its extreme. In Pittsburgh Press, the
Court upheld a city ordinance prohibiting the publishing of employment adver-
tisements under sex designated headings.'4 3 Although the majority's decision
was based upon narrow grounds, the commercial nature of the speech, '" Chief
Justice Burger dissented on the basis that the first amendment absolutely pro-
hibits any governmental interference in the content of the newspaper.'" Pitts-
138. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 256.
141. Id. The Court's use of precedent in support of its broad language in Tornillo is uncon-
vincing at best. The Court principally relied upon a footnote from Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) in which the Court upheld the application of antitrust laws to the
media. In that footnote, the Court noted in dicta that the decision "does not compel AP or
its members to permit publication of anything which their 'reason' tells them should not be
published." Id. at 20 n.1. The Court also cited dicta from three cases to support its conclusion.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-55 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commission on Human Rights,
413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 117 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
142. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 389. At the time the decision was written, the Court had not recognized first amend-
ment protection of advertising. Id. at 385 (quoting Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54
(1942)). However, even under present commercial speech doctrine as set out in Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), commercial speech concer-
ning unlawful activity is not protected.
145. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 394-95 (explaining that "I believe that the First Amend-
ment freedom of the press includes the right of a newspaper to arrange the content of its paper,
whether it be news items, editorials, or advertising, as it sees fit.").
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burgh Press does not necessarily demonstrate support for the proposed theory,
but it does show that it would not be categorically barred.
A narrower interpretation of Tornillo also seems more plausible in light
of its characterization in Wooley. In Wooley, Chief Justice Burger writing
for the majority cited Tornillo as support for the proposition that the first
amendment protects "individual freedom of the mind."'I The Court explained
that the statute unconstitutionally '"deprived a newspaper of the fundamental
right to decide what to print or omit ... ."I"" Just as the statute in Wooley
forced the Maynards to foster a point of view which they found objectionable,
the statute in Tornillo forced the newspaper to do much the same thing. In
other words, Wooley and Tornillo are based upon the same rationale.
Therefore, the protection found in Tornillo extends no further than Wooley's.
As mentioned above, the proposed theory does not involve the interests
found to be protected in the concept of "freedom of the mind."' 4 8 The full
disclosure requirement does not compel philosophical, political, or ideological
speech, butonly factual speech. Most importantly, the proposed theory does
not threaten "journalistic integrity." In Tornillo, the effect of the statute was
to compel a newspaper to print the work of an outsider. Notwithstanding
the moral dilemma, an editor might be forced to publish an article of substan-
dard quality. Since the proposed theory does not require the publishing of
an outsider's work, it does not present this problem.
D. The "Chilling Effect"
The decision in Tornillo can also be explained by the first amendment chilling
effect doctrine, 49 which forbids the imposition of the duty upon the press
that would act as a deterrent to speech. The Court in Tornillo pointed out that
[flaced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that published
news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute,
editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy.
Therefore, under the operation of the Florida statute, political and elec-
toral coverage would be blunted or reduced."'
146. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. "Hence, neither Pittsburgh Press nor Miami Herald necessarily
disposes of the issues presented by limited government control of a newspaper's policy toward
expression that is neither completely commercial nor traditionally editorial." The Supreme Court
1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 13, 180 (1974).
147. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
148. See supra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
149. Gaebler argues that traditional first amendment analysis is the primary basis of Tornillo.
Gaebler, supra note 124, at 997 n.4. However, this interpretation seems at odds with Chief Justice
Burger's assessment of the decision:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory
access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by
the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First
Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. Suffice it to say, that the opinion rests on alternate grounds.
150. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
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Although the Court did not specifically use the phrase "chilling effect," the
concept is implicit in its analysis. 5 '
Since the "chilling effect" concept has been employed in a wide variety
of situations," 2 it is logical to examine the proposed theory in light of the
cases involving the civil liability of the media.' 53 The seminal decision on that
subject is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'14 In New York Times, the premise
of the Court's chilling effect analysis was "that erroneous statement is in-
evitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need... to survive.' -,55
In order that "free debate" in society would not be inhibited, the Court held
that a public official could not recover against a media defendant for
defamatory statements concerning his official capacity absent "actual
malice"-knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the statement. 56
The New York Times standard of actual malice was applied in the Time,
Inc. v. Hill'17 which involved a right to privacy statute. In controversial dic-
tum, Justice Brennan added that the New York Times standard also applies
to false reports of all "matters of public interest."' 58 He further stated that
a negligence standard would never be permissible in this context, "[flear of
large verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely negligent misstatement,
151. The basis of the Court's chilling effect analysis in Tornillo is that newspapers have limited
resources. "The first phase of the penalty resulting from the compelled printing of a reply is
exacted in terms of the cost in printing and composing time and materials and in taking up
space that could be devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to print." Id.
at 256. This penalty coupled with the possible criminal sanction might deter the publishing of
controversial material. Id. at 256. See Note, Reaffirming the Freedom of the Press: Another
Look at Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 73 MicH. L. REv. 186, 204-14 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Reaffirming the Freedom of the Press]. Perhaps the Court's reluctance to employ overtly
the "chilling effect" doctrine suggests that it is presently in disfavor as a distinct doctrine of
constitutional law. See Reaffirming the Freedom of the Press, supra, at 210 (arguing that recent
decisions indicate that the Court is re-evaluating the doctrine).
152. The "chilling effect" doctrine is an all encompassing term originally used as a descriptive
phrase and not as a theoretical concept. See The Chilling Effect, supra note 4, at 808-09. Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 345 (1970), coined the
phrase: "We have molded both substantive rights and procedural remedies in the face of varied
conflicting interests to conform to our overriding duty to insulate all individuals from the 'chill-
ing effect' upon exercise of First Amendment freedoms generated by vagueness, overbreadth,
and unbridled discretion to limit their exercise." The term has been employed in a wide variety
of contexts and has developed into a doctrine in and of itself. See The Chilling Effect, supra
note 4, at 808-09 (citing examples of the varied circumstances when used, e.g., NLRB v. American
Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965) (word of art in labor cases); Tennessee Pub. Co. v. Carpenter,
100 F.2d 728, 734 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 659 (1939) (case involving judicially
regulated sales)).
153. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
154. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
155. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
156. Id. at 279-80.
157. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
158. Id. at 388-89.
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even fear of the expense involved in their defense, must inevitably cause
publishers to 'steer . . . wider of the unlawful zone.' "159
At first glance, both cases would seem by analogy to prohibit the proposed
theory's standard of negligence. However, a case decided seven years after
Hill, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' 60 casts considerable doubt on the con-
tinued vitality of the principles announced in Time, Inc. I6 , In Gertz, the Court
retreated from its earlier position and denied the protection of New York
Times to defendants in defamation actions brought by private individuals.
The Court announced that "public officials" or "public figures" may recover
only upon a showing of "actual malice,"' 62 but states are free to determine
the standard of liability in actions brought by private individuals against the
media "so long as they do not impose liability without fault."' 6 3 The Court
left open the standard to be applied in actions brought by a private individual
against a non-media defendant. ,
Although the libel analysis in Gertz is not directly on point, it seems likely
that any constitutional analysis of the proposed theory would be based upon
its methodology. In Gertz, the Court employed a methodology which has been
called "definitional" because it presents an alternative to either absolute rules
or ad hoc balancing.'6" Professor Tribe argues that this type of balancing
is appropriate where the government aims at protecting an ideological neutral
interest, such as the reputational interests of individuals."6 5
This methodology is useful in examining the proposed theory because the
interest it seeks to protect, the bodily safety of individuals, is likewise content
neutral. The weighting of interests involved in the proposed theory is also
analogous to the weighting of interests in a defamation action brought by
private individuals, except the scales tip to a greater degree in favor of pro-
tection of the individual. In Gertz, the Court identified the individual's reputa-
tion interest as the value being protected'66 and found that private individuals
are more vulnerable to injury and more deserving of protection.'67 The pro-
posed theory, however, seeks to protect more than the individual's reputa-
tion; it seeks to protect his physical safety. As pointed out above, the proposed
theory is an individual's only means of legal redress. Therefore, the balanc-
ing favors a negligence standard.
Furthermore, a stricter standard than negligence would virtually defeat the
proposed theory. Part of the reason for the Court's shift in Gertz was that
159. Id. at 389 (quoting New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279).
160. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
161. See TRIBE, supra note 38, § 12-13, at 638-40.
162. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
163. Id. at 347.
164. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 942 (1968).
165. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 12-13, at 641. For a more in-depth discussion of Tribe's analysis
of the balancing test, see TRIBE, supra note 38, § 12-20, at 682-88.
166. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
167. Id. at 345.
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the New York Times standard was so strict that "[p]lainly many deserving
plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury [were] unable to
surmount the barrier of the New York Times test."' 6 8 This effect would be
heightened in the proposed theory. Design features are by their very nature
difficult to characterize.' 69 Conventional products liability analysis compen-
sates for this difficulty by applying a standard of fault stricter than simple
negligence; many times knowledge is imputed to the manufacturer.' 70 Apply-
ing a standard of fault based upon the subjective knowledge of the defendant
would virtually emasculate the proposed theory.
Whatever validity the "chilling effect" doctrine has in other areas of the
first amendment, none is present in failure to warn cases. In the context of
defamation actions, Professor Tribe argues that the inherent flexibility of the
negligence standard leaves too much room for improper motives, such as sup-
pression of radical speakers, and other improper factors, such as prejudice,
to influence the jury."' This argument seems no more relevant to negligent
failure to warn cases based upon published factual material than to all
negligence actions. Of course, a jury might have difficulty determining what
is "reasonable" conduct of a publisher. But juries are frequently asked to
decide questions about which they have no prior knowledge. Courts develop
doctrines so that juries do not have unbridled discretion. For instance in Gertz,
the Court held that an action against a media defendant could not proceed
unless a publisher had notice, actual or constructive, of the defamatory
content." This workable standard could be applied to the concepts of the
proposed theory to ensure that frivolous claims could be disposed of before
trial.
The final possible objection to the proposed theory is essentially a "slip-
pery slope" argument: recognition of liability based upon fault in this in-
stance would open the floodgates to disaster. Professor Tribe argues that "the
very existence of that body of law [based upon media fault] may be a threat
of further encroachments on the liberties of the press inasmuch as its rules
will be adaptable to other and more comprehensive systems of press
regulation."' The logical extension of his rule, however, would bar any
liability of the press based on fault, a position that has been rejected by the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never found the first
amendment to give to the press rights that other citizens do not enjoy.' 74 "[T]he
168. Id. at 342.
169. See Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A
and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439, 456 (1969) (Professor Dickerson argues "a design feature
is often hard to characterize as legally defective, whereas a deviant item is labeled by its very
abnormality.").
170. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
171. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 12-13, at 645.
172. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
173. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 12-13, at 647.
174.
The Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press Clause confers upon
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contention that the freedom of the press is the freedom to do wrong with
impunity" "' has never been accepted. Physical injury is no less harmful merely
because it results from negligent language rather than from negligent deeds.
As the Weirum v. RKO General court pointed out, "[t]he First Amendment






The underlying theme of this Note's discussion is that preconceived ideas
necessarily lead to superficial legal analysis. Only by eschewing labels and
probing beneath the surface can issues be truly resolved. This Note has pointed
to a discrepancy in the law of torts. A publisher may publish material causing
physical harm with impunity, although liability is imposed for negligent use
of language in many other circumstances. The proposed theory fills this
historical gap and resolves policy concerns of prior cases by limiting liability
to the narrowest of circumstances based upon the publisher's subjective in-
tent that the material be relied upon. Although freedom of speech concerns
are superficially implicated, an in-depth analysis of the compelled speech re-
quirement reveals that the proposed theory does not impermissibly intrude
upon any protected interest. The proposed theory is not meant to be a panacea
for all cases in which published material causes physical harm, but does serve
as a theoretical starting point allowing rules to give way to principles so that
justice may prevail.'
LISA A. POWELL
the "institutional press" any freedom from governmental restraint not enjoyed by
all others. . . . Because the First Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom
to express and communicate ideas, I can see no difference between the right of
those who seek to disseminate ideas by way of a newspaper and those who give
lectures or speeches and seek to enlarge the audience by publication and wide
dissemination.
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
175. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918).
176. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 48, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975).
177. See Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., Negligent Misrepresentation by Accoun-
tants, 67 L.Q. RE,. 466, 468 n.7 (1951) (quoting LORD WRIGHT, LEGAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES
334, "'Law must be regarded as a living organism; its rules are subsidiary to justice and must,
so far as precedent and logic permit, be moulded so as to conform with justice."'). In that
article, Seavey argued that Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., 1951 1 ALL E.R. 426, which
upheld the rule that accountants could not be held liable for merely negligent misrepresentations
to one not in privity, was wrongly decided. That rule was subsequently overruled. See supra note 81.
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